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Forms, Patterns, Structures. 
Citation Analysis and History of Analytic Philosophy. 
Eugenio Petrovich1 
Abstract: In this brief note I discuss two citation analysis-based studies in history of analytic 
philosophy that I recently published, highlighting some of their methodological features. In the 
first section, I sum up the two studies, focusing on the three methodologies that were used 
(citation counting, co-citation analysis, and citation context analysis). In the second section, I 
advance three remarks on these studies. Firstly, I argue that citation analysis methods produce a 
formal representation of their object, i.e. they shed light on the form rather than the content of 
the object. Secondly, I argue that these methods have an ontological counterpart: they frame the 
object under study at the documental level. I point out that this level should be distinguished 
both from the intellectual level that is studied by the internalist history of philosophy and from 
the social level that is studied by the externalist history of philosophy. Thirdly, I point out that 
citation analysis allows to reach a panoramic point of view on the object under study. Such 
perspective unveils patterns that are invisible at the micro-scale and that are difficult to study by 
traditional methodologies. I argue in particular that we need to develop new theories and concepts 
to better understand the objects and phenomena we observe from this distant point of view. In 
the third section, I highlight the strengths and weaknesses of citation analysis. The main strengths 
are epistemological, heuristic, and methodological, whereas the weaknesses relate to the losses 
caused by the translation of object at the documental level, the risk of being distracted by 
mathematical properties that lack a clear interpretation, and the problems involved in the 
validation of the results. I conclude by stressing the need for an interdisciplinary research 
programme that integrates citation analysis, history of philosophy, and the social studies of 
science. 
 
The aim of this brief note is to present some methodological remarks on two citation analysis-based 
studies in history of analytic philosophy I recently published (Petrovich, 2018; Petrovich & Buonomo, 
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2018). Both studies applied scientometric methods to the recent history of analytic philosophy. 
Scientometrics is the discipline investigating the quantitative aspects of science and technology (Nalimov 
& Mulchenko, 1971). Its main method is the analysis of citations (citation analysis). Scientific papers are 
mutually connected by citations, i.e. the cited references that each scientific paper presents. These 
connections can be studied from different points of view: the number of citations a document or an 
author collects over time can be counted, developing the so-called scientometric indicators; similarities 
between papers can be calculated by counting how many times they are cited together (co-citation 
analysis); the relation between basic science and technology can be assessed by studying how patents cite 
the scientific literature, and so on (Mingers & Leydesdorff, 2015). The studies I will comment on here 
were both based on citation analysis and they both addressed the so-called “late analytic philosophy”, i.e. 
the analytic philosophy of the last thirty-forty years (Tripodi, 2015, Chapter 4).  
This note is structured as follows. Firstly, I will briefly sum up the two studies, focusing on the three 
methodologies employed (citation counting, co-citation analysis, and citation context analysis). Secondly, 
I will highlight three methodological features shared by both studies: I will argue that they provide a formal 
representation of the object under study, that they address what I will call the documental level of analytic 
philosophy, and that they allow to reach a panoramic point of view on scientific and scholarly disciplines. 
Lastly, I will discuss strengths and weaknesses of using citation analysis for historical purposes, discussing 
three “epistemological risks” that may arise in the context of this kind of studies. 
1. SUM UP OF THE TWO STUDIES 
1.1. CITATION COUNTING AND CO-CITATION ANALYSIS 
In the first study2, that I conducted with my colleague Valerio Buonomo, we performed two citation 
analyses on late analytic philosophy production, citation counting and co-citation analysis, using the VOSviewer 
software (van Eck & Waltman, 2010). We took as target of our analysis all the articles published in five 
highly prestigious analytic philosophy journals (The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research) between 1985 and 2014. Thus, we worked on a corpus of 4 966 
articles, containing 58 281 references to 17 926 authors. The first analysis (citation counting) is a very 
basic one, consisting in counting the citations a document or an author receives in a certain set of 
publications. The outcome of the analysis is classically a ranking that allows to gauge the “impact”, i.e. the 
citation score, of different documents and authors in the selected literature. In our study, we presented 
rankings of most-cited documents and most-cited authors in the five target journals. These rankings 
allowed to measure the weight, in terms of citations, of authors belonging to different phases of analytic 
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philosophy (early, middle and late) in contemporary analytic debates (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, tabs. 
1 - 4). The second analysis (co-citation analysis) is a technique developed in the context of science 
mapping, i.e. the research area that aims at describing the structure of science based on the citation 
relationships amongst scientific documents (Börner, Theriault, & Boyack, 2015). Co-citation analysis was 
introduced in the 1970s (Small, 1973). The underlying idea is that documents that are frequently cited 
together (i.e. frequently co-cited documents) deal with similar topic or belong to the same research area. 
Mapping co-citation relationships allows then to reconstruct the sub-disciplinary structure of science. 
Results of co-citation analysis are classically visualized in the form of “maps”, i.e. two- or three-
dimensional visualizations that represent visually the co-citation relationships between documents. 
VOSviewer, in particular, offers a two-dimensional distance-based visualization, where the distance 
between the nodes representing the documents is inversely proportional to their co-citation frequencies: 
the higher the co-citation frequency between two documents is, the closer they will be represented on 
the map. In our study, we used co-citation analysis to map the structure of the articles published between 
1985 and 2014 in the five journals mentioned above. We mapped both the overall production and the 
articles published in three consecutive decades ([1985-1994], [1995-2004] and [2005-2014]), in order to 
investigate both the structure and the dynamics of the field in the last thirty years. Regarding the overall 
map, the main finding was that the map of analytic philosophy presents a clear sub-disciplinary structure, 
where clusters of documents belonging to different sub-areas of the field (such as metaphysics, 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, etc.) are easily recognizable (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018, fig. 1). 
Regarding the longitudinal analysis, i.e. the sequence of maps in time, the main result was that the co-
citation network becomes, from the first map to the last, more and more structured, changing from a 
sparse network to a clusterized configuration where distinct clusters of documents are evident (Petrovich 
& Buonomo, 2018, figs 2 a, b, c). We interpreted this pattern as the sign of an increasing specialization (i.e. 
fragmentation into sub-disciplinary areas) of analytic philosophy. 
1.2. CITATION CONTEXT ANALYSIS 
In the second study3 I used a different approach to the study of citations, known as citation context 
analysis. In citation context analysis, the portion of citing text surrounding the citation is considered. This 
allows to classify citations according to their function (distinguishing for instance positive from critical 
citations, substantive from perfunctory citations) (Bornmann & Daniel, 2008). The aim of the study was 
to assess a claim recently made by historians of analytic philosophy, namely that analytic philosophy has 
approached in the last decades a style of intellectual production close to the Kuhnian normal science (see, 
amongst others, (Levy, 2003; Marconi, 2014; Putnam, 1997; Richardson, 2008)). This was done by 
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classifying the citations appearing in analytic philosophy articles according to their epistemological 
function, and assessing how the distribution of the different categories of citations changed over time. 
Compared to the previous study, this one uses a larger time-window (1950-2010) in order to trace the 
evolution from middle to late analytic philosophy. However, the corpus was much smaller, consisting of 
60 articles: six sets of 10 papers, drawn from the same five journals of the previous study, with each set 
drawn from a decade between 1950s to 2000s. The total number of citation analyzed amounted to 1 293. 
The different size of the corpus depends on the fact that the articles had to be close-read in order to 
classify the citations. The main finding of the study was that the rate of the “State-of-the art” kind of 
citations (i.e. the citations that are used to provide an overview of the sub-area to which the paper is 
meant to contribute) increased steadily from 1960s to 2000s (Petrovich, 2018, fig. 5). At the same time, 
however, the rate of “Positive” citations (i.e. the citations that are used to support the claims of the citing 
paper) followed an up-and-down pattern (Petrovich, 2018, fig. 3). I interpreted these results as indicating 
a fragmentation of the field into several definite sub-areas. Within each of the sub-areas there is a lack of 
consensus among analytic philosophers, as in traditional philosophical debates. Nevertheless, a consensus 
emerges at the level of the whole field over the background structure of analytic philosophy, i.e. analytic 
philosophers seem to agree on the sub-disciplinary divisions of analytic philosophy. Thus, it can be 
concluded that a sort of soft paradigm – concerning the structure of the field – has indeed emerged in the 
last decades. 
I will not comment further the results of these two studies and will now move to commenting some 
methodological features they shared, discussing also the differences between citation analysis-based 
methods and the classic methods of history of philosophy. 
2. METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS 
2.1. A FORMAL REPRESENTATION 
The two studies summarized above share – even if at different levels – a feature that is typical of 
scientometrics in general: they provide a formal representation of their object (Wouters, 1999b, 1999a). In 
fact, the three analyses described above (citation counting, co-citation analysis, citation context analysis) 
all focused on the relationships between documents (namely, the citations), not on the contents of the 
documents. They dealt with the form rather than the content of late analytic philosophy. This is most 
evident in the case of co-citation analysis: the visual outcome of the analysis is a network map where the 
crucial point is the reciprocal distance between items on the map, not the items in themselves. What a science 
map shows, is the structure of a set of documents, i.e. the formal relations between them, not their content. 
The same holds for citation counting: the citation score of a document or an author is the result of the 
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sum of the relationships it has with other documents or authors. This is clear if we imagine the cited 
document as a node in a network: the number of citations it collects is in fact nothing more than the 
number of links it has with other documents. The citation score of a document is always dependent on 
its being part of a set of other documents, it depends structurally on the fact that it is not isolated. Thus, 
also the citation score is a formal property of a document, incorporating into a single measure the number 
of links it has with all the other documents. Lastly, in the case of citation context analysis, the focus is 
again on the link between the cited and the citing documents. However, in this case, we also take into 
consideration the kind of link, in order to enrich the citation network of the citing document with a further, 
qualitative dimension (the epistemological function, in our case). Still, this qualitative information denotes 
the relationship between documents, not directly their content, and is therefore a property of the form. 
Thus, all these analyses provide a formal representation of the object under study, in the sense that they 
are mainly concerned with relations between items, i.e. with structures. More specifically, they are grounded 
in a network approach to their object: they represent their object as a set of nodes connected by a set of 
links. Now, a crucial aspect of formal representations in general is that they need to be interpreted in order 
to get a meaning4. Note that the interpretation works differently in the three cases, raising different 
methodological issues. 
In the case of the science maps discussed in (Petrovich & Buonomo, 2018), the formal representation is 
provided by the VOSviewer algorithm in the form of a two-dimensional visualization of the co-citation 
relations between documents, the so-called map. As said above, the map presents a clear structure, i.e. 
documents are not arranged randomly. In particular, they are distributed in different clusters, that the 
VOSviewer algorithm detects and visualizes in different colors. However, the meaning of the clusters is 
not directly showed in the map. It needs to be inferred by looking at the contents of the documents of 
each cluster. For instance, the red cluster showed in Fig.1 can be labelled “metaphysics” because it 
contains several documents (such as Lewis’s On the Plurality of Worlds and Quine’s World and Object) whose 
content regards this area of analytic philosophy. Now, the interpretation of the map consists precisely in 
relaying its structure (the clusters) with the intellectual content of the documents it shows. This process 
is known in scientometric literature as the “validation” of the map and it is usually done by asking to 
experts of the field to look at the scientometric map and judge if it matches with their representation of 
the research area. Therefore, the interpretation always requires a qualitative element (the assessment of 
field experts) to match the quantitative representation. 
In the case of the citation counting, the interpretation of the data consists in attributing a meaning to the 
citation score. In particular, the question that should be answered is the following: what does a high (or 
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low) number of citations mean? Note that this question opens two very different venues of research: a 
descriptive and a normative. In the descriptive venue, the question concerns, for instance, the relation 
between highly cited documents and Kuhnian paradigms (Small, 2003). Can they be considered the same? 
Do highly cited documents play the role of Kuhnian paradigms? In the normative venue, on the other 
hand, the question concerns the relation between the citation score of a document and its scientific – or, 
in the case of analytic philosophy, philosophical – quality. In fact, the main application of scientometrics 
is in research performance evaluation: scientometric indicators such as the Journal Impact Factor® or 
the H-Index are increasingly used in evaluation exercises to gauge the scientific quality of journals, 
universities, laboratories and even individual researchers. The underlying assumption is that citation 
scores do have a normative value, i.e. they can be used as proxies for research quality. In particular, high 
citation score would mean a high research quality. Note that the very notion of “research quality” is 
intrinsically a normative one, because it implies the reference to standards and desiderata. Thus, the 
interpretation of citation scores, also in the case of analytic philosophy, potentially opens a huge normative 
and meta-philosophical problem. Normative because it regards the idea of research quality, and meta-
philosophical because it concerns how philosophical research should be conducted. I think that the mere 
use of citation counting cannot answer the question whether citations are proxies for research quality. 
Nevertheless, if this equation is accepted, then citation score would have a clear interpretation and citation 
counting would become indeed a method to empirically measure philosophical quality. 
Lastly, in the case of citation context analysis, the formal representation consists in distributions of 
categories of citations over time, visualized, for instance, in the form of box plots. The interpretation of 
these statistical estimates depends on the meaning of the different categories used to classify citations. In 
turn, the categories are designed based on an epistemological theory of the possible roles of citations. If we 
change the categories or the theory that attributes meaning to them, this affects the interpretation of the 
trends and patterns visible in the statistics. In other terms, we have always to take into consideration the 
well-known phenomenon of underdetermination: the evidence constraints but does not determine our 
interpretation of it (Stanford, 2017). Once again, the interpretation depends on a theoretical element that 
is not provided by the formal representation alone, but should be supplied by the interpreter.  
In sum, the first methodological remark I would like to make on these two studies is that scientometrics 
and citation analysis provide a formal representation of their object. This form is a pure mathematical or 
statistical structure that has no meaning per se. The meaning needs to be introduced by the human element, 
and this is the role of the historian. Therefore, the use of quantitative methods does not cancel out the 
historian from the equation, but, on the contrary, highlights his/her role as an interpreter and, even, a 
theory-builder.   
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2.2. THE DOCUMENTAL LEVEL 
The different approaches to the history of philosophy can be classified in a spectrum ranging from 
internalist to externalist approaches (Rorty, Schneewind, & Skinner, 1984). Internalist approaches focus 
on intellectual contents, such as philosophical theories, arguments, notions, concepts, etc., whereas 
externalist approaches focus on the historical, social and political contexts of philosophical ideas. In the 
label history of philosophy, internalists put the emphasis on “philosophy”, rather than “history”: the 
object of historical reconstruction is the “context of justification” of philosophical doctrines, not their 
historical and sociological genesis (the “context of discovery”), which is the object of externalist history 
of philosophy (Reichenbach, 1938). The most internalist kind of history of philosophy is the so-called 
“rational reconstruction” (Rorty, 1984). In this kind of history, all historical factors are ignored, and the 
doctrines of the past philosophers are discussed and assessed as they were contemporary colleagues. Past 
philosophical theories are discussed from a sort of a-temporal point of view, in the pure “space of 
reasons”. On the other end of the spectrum, we find full-fledged externalist approaches to the history of 
philosophy. Sociology of philosophy is the main representative of this kind of approach (Kusch, 1995, 
2000). Following the tradition of Mannheim sociology of knowledge and the Strong Programme in 
sociology of science, it aims at showing how the ideas are shaped (and even determined) by the social 
context in which they are produced. In between these two extremes there are intermediate approaches 
that mix internalist and externalist considerations, attributing from time to time different weights to 
intellectual and social factors.  
What is the position of the scientometric approach in the internalist-externalist spectrum? I think that in 
order to answer this question, we need to frame the internalist-externalist debate in ontological terms, i.e. 
we need to focus on the kind of object the two approaches focus on. As we said above, internalist 
approaches consider philosophy as a set of “ideas”, i.e. as a set of intellectual “items” that have at least a 
certain degree of independency from their creators. In other terms, ideas can be discussed per se: they can 
be put in relation with other ideas, if they are arguments they can be rejected, if they are notions they can 
be clarified, etc. In internalist history of philosophy, ideas are considered as inhabitants of what Popper 
calls the Third World, the world of “objective knowledge”, that is distinct both from the First World (the 
physical world) and the Second World (the mental world) (Popper, 1979). On the other hand, in 
externalist approaches, ideas are considered as essentially connected with their context. In fact, they are 
considered as the product of a certain disposition of social features. They cannot be considered as 
independent entities. In fact, the true objects of externalist histories of philosophy are not ideas, but 
agents, i.e. the producers of ideas. Agents use ideas as resources to advance their own interests, and the 
evolution of ideas in time can be explained only by taking in consideration their strategic use (Collins, 
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1998; Kusch, 1995).5 Ideas are social objects that are not individuated by a set of intellectual 
commitments, but by the community of actors advancing them. 
Now, the scientometric approach is, I think, intermediate between the internalist and externalist approach. 
This intermediate status is a direct consequence of the methodology that is typical of scientometrics. 
Scientometrics does not address directly scientific activity, but only its public outcome, i.e. articles 
published in scientific journals. From these articles, citations are extracted, and the formal relations 
between pieces of knowledge are studied via citation analysis. Therefore, publications and citations are 
the true object of scientometrics, they are the ontological counterpart of the scientometric method. Every 
application of scientometric methods to an object of study, such as analytic philosophy, will involve a 
translation of that object into a relevant set of documents and citations. This translation is a form of 
operationalization, i.e. the transformation of a concept into something to which a certain form of research 
method can be applied successfully (Chang, 2009).6 In both the studies I am commenting, late analytic 
philosophy was operationalized into a set of documents, defining it at what we may call the documental 
level.  
Thus, in scientometrics, the object of study is neither defined as a set of ideas (internalist approach) nor 
as a set of agents (externalist approach), but as a set of published documents (publications). Publications can 
be considered as the interface between the abstract realm of ideas and the social field of actors, since they 
share features of both “Worlds”, to use Popper’s phrase.7 They share with ideas the property of existing 
independently of their creators, since they are public objects that can circulate even beyond the intentions 
of their authors. At the same time, they share with the social level the property of being concrete and 
spatio-temporally determined. Publications have definite coordinates and boundaries, they are not 
abstract objects in the intellectual space. Therefore, scientometrics allows to capture an object of study 
at an intermediate level that does not coincide neither with the strictly intellectual point of view, typical 
of internalist history of philosophy, nor with the strictly social point of view, typical of externalist history 
of philosophy. Scientometrics is therefore a sort of ontological middle point between internal and external 
history.8  
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2.3. TOWARDS A MASSIVE AND PANORAMIC HISTORY 
Traditional history of philosophy basically relies on one key method: close reading of texts. This poses 
serious limitations to the amount of sources that can be handled by the historian of philosophy. One of 
the main motivations for turning to “distant reading” methodologies is in fact the intention to overcome 
the cognitive limits of the individual scholar, using computers and algorithms to enlarge enormously the 
amount of data that can be used in the analysis. This paves the road to a massive, data-driven history. 
Scientometrics shares with distant reading (and with digital humanities more generally) this “big-data” 
approach. Citation analyses are conducted on thousands, even millions of documents. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that scientometric indicators are meaningful only if they are performed on huge amounts 
of data, adopting a “thermodynamic” approach that focuses on the aggregate rather than the individual 
behavior (Price, 1986; van Raan, 1998). As we saw above, the map of late analytic philosophy we 
presented in the first study was the result of processing almost 5 000 articles: it would have been simply 
impossible to read all of them in the traditional way. The same holds for the citation counting analysis: 
recording manually the citations to authors and documents would have been a tremendously time-
consuming task.  
The shift from small to large sets of texts has two important consequences: it shifts the scale from the 
micro to the macro and the focus from the individual to the collective. This has the effect of moving 
towards what we may call a panoramic point of view. The panoramic point of view allows to observe 
phenomena that cannot be perceived at the micro level, or that can be perceived only qualitatively as 
anecdotal evidence. This is the case of the phenomenon of specialization. The trend towards an increasing 
specialization is perceived by analytic philosophers but it can hardly be investigated at the micro-level 
and with close reading methods, because it is a trend involving the whole field, not a specific author or 
philosophical theory. Hence, it is difficult to test by traditional methods whether or not the perception 
of analytic philosophers is true. The panoramic view of the science mapping, on the other hand, allows 
to observe the dynamics of the whole field, and therefore to check the perception of the field members 
against quantitative patterns. Indeed, as we saw above, the use of longitudinal co-citation analysis (i.e. the 
mapping of analytic philosophy production by decades) allowed to observe a clusterization pattern that 
can be interpreted as the effect of the fragmentation of analytic philosophy into definite sub-specialty 
areas.  
I said that the panoramic point of view changes the scale of the analysis, allowing to detect macro-
phenomena such as specialization, but also the focus, highlighting the collective dimension of a field. 
Again, this is evident for all the kinds of citation analysis. Citation analysis as such involve the use of 
citations, and citations are a sign of the embedding of the documents into a fabric of documents, i.e. a 
network, that is constitutively a collective entity. The individual authors, when they cite, contribute to the 
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“weaving” of the fabric of documents, and their collective efforts results in the overall structure of the 
network.  
Now, I suggest that we should consider the idea that the direction of causation goes not only from the 
individual to the structure, but also on the other way, from the structure to the individual. In other terms, 
I suggest the existence of feedback mechanism from the structure to the individual. This means that the 
individual action is constrained by the structure, i.e. the structure reduces the degrees of freedom of the 
individual. If this suggestion is correct, the structure and the trend that are revealed by citation analysis 
can be interpreted as the collective constraints that the individual actors face when they interact with the field. 
The physical metaphor of the “field” is particularly suitable for describing this interaction. A gravitational 
field is revealed by the effect it has on the masses interacting with it – and this effect is manifested as 
gravitational attraction on the masses. In the same way, I suggest interpreting the clusters in the maps as 
different centers of gravity that exert a force on the individual actors, restraining their possible actions. 
Furthermore, the trend revealed in the longitudinal analysis can be interpreted by another physical notion: 
the notion of inertia. An individual actor that wants to invert the trend (for example, address general 
philosophical themes instead of specialized and delimited philosophical puzzles) must deal with the 
inertia of the whole field, that pushes all the actors towards specialization.  
In sum, the panoramic point of view that results from operating with huge amounts of data does not 
only modify the scale of the studies but allows to unveil new types of dynamics. I think that an important 
task for historians of philosophy that want to use these methods consists in developing a good theory of 
these dynamics, forging new concepts for phenomena that are visible only from the panoramic 
perspective.9 
3. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CITATION ANALYSIS  
Scientometric methods based on citations present both strengths and weaknesses when they are used for 
historical purposes. I already mentioned some of them in the previous paragraphs. I want now to 
systematize them, starting from the strengths. I think that they can be divided into epistemological, 
heuristic, and methodological strengths: 
1) From an epistemological point of view, the main strength of scientometrics is that it allows to 
operationalize elusive notions (such as “specialization”) into definite and measurable features. This 
happens because the translation of the object of study into a documental object (i.e. into a set of 
documents) plays a crucial role in the very methodology of scientometrics. The operationalization 
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allows to test by quantitative means historical claims put forward by historians of philosophy. I think 
this is an important step towards a more robust and empirically oriented history of philosophy.  
2) The panoramic point of view that is reached when a massive amount of documents is analyzed 
via citation analysis allows to unveil trends and patterns that are invisible at the micro scale and 
from a close-reading standpoint. Thus, this perspective can generate new ways of reading the 
historical material, providing a significant heuristic gain to the historian of philosophy. 
3) Regarding the methodology, it must be stressed that scientometric and citation analysis are not 
incompatible with close reading or traditional methodologies. In fact, quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be coupled, for instance in the citation context analysis. This allows to enhance both 
kinds of analysis and, most of all, to interpret more clearly the results of quantitative analyses. As 
we saw above, data do not speak by themselves: they need always to be interpreted within a 
theoretical framework. The formal representation has to be filled with a meaning. Quali-
quantitative methods can indeed enable the interpretation of results. 
At the same time, however, there are several weaknesses of citation analysis as an historical tool that 
cannot be ignored. There are technical limitations as well as what we may call “epistemological risks”. 
Concerning the technical limitations, it must be noticed that the available citation databases (Clarivate’s 
Web of Science, Elsevier’s Scopus and Google’s Google Scholar) have a limited coverage and historical 
depth. Books and monographs are not indexed in the database10 and there are biases in the coverage of 
journals. In particular, English-language journals are disproportionally represented in the databases. 
Moreover, citation data before 1980s are only partially reliable. In general, the coverage of Humanities 
and Social Sciences is unsatisfactory, compared to the natural sciences and bio-medical areas. These 
technical limitations are widely discussed in the scientometric literature and the reader can refer to this 
literature for more details on this point.11 For the purposes of this note, I think it is more interesting to 
discuss some “epistemological risks” that are involved in using citation analysis for historical purposes. 
They concern the losses in the operationalization process, the independent life of mathematical objects, 
and the problem of validation of results. 
3.1. LOSSES IN THE OPERATIONALIZATION PROCESS 
When the intellectual level (the level of ideas) is translated to the documental level (the level of 
publications), this does not happen without losses. Furthermore, if we consider only the publications 
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indexed in a database, this imposes a further limitation to the object we study. By focusing only on the 
published product of philosophical research, we lose the entire process of production of the philosophical 
contents. We lose what we may call, following Latour’s notion of “science in action”, the “philosophy in 
action”. The losses involved in the operationalization should always be kept in mind when we interpret 
the results. It is important to be clear about what aspect of our object we are describing and about the 
fact that the description is constrained by the method we use. We should always be wary of excessive 
generalizations. 
3.2. THE INDEPENDENT LIFE OF MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS 
Quantitative methods in general produce quantitative images of their object. The quantitative features 
can hence be manipulated by mathematical means (for instance, by statistical analysis). In the case of 
scientometrics, we saw above that the documental level is represented as a network. A network can be 
described mathematically as a mathematical object called “graph”, so that the documental level can be 
related to the mathematical theory of graph. This theory offers a lot of interesting tools for studying the 
properties of networks (for example, all the different measures of “centrality”, such as degree centrality, 
betweenness, Eigenvalues, etc.). However, a concrete risk arises of being lost into the mathematical 
properties of the network, losing sight of the meaning that such properties have for our object of study. 
An example would help to clarify this point. Imagine we analyze the science map of late analytic 
philosophy with a cluster algorithm. This algorithm “recognizes” the different sub-communities of the 
network, grouping similar items into the same cluster. Then, it is possible to ask whether there is a relation 
between the number of clusters and the number of items contained in each cluster. Is there any 
mathematical relation holding between these two quantities? Is it dependent from the cluster algorithm 
we choose? Questions like these are interesting, but it is not straightforward that their answers would 
shed light on the object that is represented with the science map. They seem to concern more the 
representation than the object represented, or, to use the terminology introduced above, they seem to regard 
only the formal properties of the object. Therefore, quantitative methods raise technical and mathematical 
problems that have a life “of their own”: the risk is to pursue these problems losing sight of the target.   
3.3. LACK OF VALIDATION VS. REINVENTING THE WHEEL 
In discussing the strengthens of scientometrics as a tool, I highlighted the fact that it can unveil patterns 
that cannot be observed with classical methods. However, this also raises the issue of the validation of the 
results obtained by scientometric methods. If they unveil patterns that are invisible at the qualitative level, 
how can they be assessed? Imagine that a science map cannot be easily interpreted by the experts of the 
field: should we reject the results of the map or the assessment of the experts? There is also a mirror risk: 
if the experts recognize easily the map as a faithful representation of their field, what is the advantage 
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that is gained by using science maps instead of the classic reviews of the literature? The use of quantitative 
images of our object of study presents therefore a double risk: if they match the already-known 
representation, then they add nothing to our knowledge; if they contradict the judgement of the experts, 
then we lack an independent source of validation for the results. In sum, scientometric and citation 
analysis are in between the Scylla of reinventing the wheel and the Charybdis of meaningless results. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this brief note, I discussed three main methodological aspects of the two studies I recently published 
on the history of recent analytic philosophy. I focused on the methodological consequences of the use 
of scientometrics and citation analysis methods as research tools. Firstly, I argued that these methods 
produce a formal representation of their object, i.e. they shed light on the form rather than the content 
of the object. The role of the historian is to attribute a meaning to the formal mathematical structure by 
providing an interpretation of the data. Secondly, I argued that these methods have an ontological 
counterpart: they frame the object under study at the documental level, i.e. as a set of (published) 
documents. This level of analysis should be distinguished both from the intellectual level (the ideas) and 
the social level (the social actors) and considered as the interface between them. Thirdly, I pointed out 
that scientometrics allows to reach a panoramic point of view on the object under study. Such perspective 
allows to unveil patterns that are invisible at the micro-scale and that are difficult to study by traditional 
methodologies (i.e. close-reading). I argued that we need to develop new theories and concepts to better 
understand the objects and phenomena we observe from this distant point of view. Lastly, in the third 
section I highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of scientometrics and citation analysis. The main 
strengths are epistemological (enhancing the empirical test of historical claims), heuristic (generating new 
hypotheses) and methodological (coupling with close-reading method). On the other hand, the 
weaknesses regard the losses caused by the translation of object at the documental level, the risk of being 
distracted by mathematical properties that lack an interpretation, and the problems involved in the 
validation of the results. 
I think that the scientometric study of philosophy is just at the beginning. It should be extended both in 
the scope, considering other areas of philosophy, and in the theoretical machinery: as I stressed many 
times in this note, we need to develop new concepts to interpret insightfully the results of quantitative 
methods. Therefore, I believe that we need a closer interaction with other areas of philosophy (namely, 
philosophy of science, historical and social epistemology) and with the social sciences (sociology of 
science, Science and Technology Studies), promoting a true inter- and trans-disciplinary research 
programme. 
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